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Abstract
Empirical studies have shown that food stamp participants spend a higher propor-
tion of their benefit on food than they would with an equivalent amount of cash.
Our study demonstrates that this result can be explained by the decisionmaking
behavior of multi-adult households.  Multi-adult households spend a higher pro-
portion of their food stamp benefit than they would with an equivalent amount of
cash.  In contrast, single-adult households show little difference in food spending
between food stamps and an equivalent amount of cash.  Because over 30 percent
of food stamp participants are in multi-adult households, switching from food
stamps to cash may reduce food purchases of these needy households.  If that is
indeed the case, the use of food stamps and other in-kind benefits may be more
desirable than other forms of assistance.
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Summary
Empirical studies have shown that food stamp participants spend a higher propor-
tion of their benefit on food than they would with an equivalent amount of cash.
Our study demonstrates that this result can be explained by the decisionmaking
behavior of multi-adult households.  Multi-adult households spend a higher pro-
portion of their food stamp benefit than they would with an equivalent amount of
cash.  In contrast, single-adult households show little difference in food spending
between food stamps and an equivalent amount of cash.  Because over 30 percent
of food stamp participants are in multi-adult households, switching from food
stamps to cash may reduce food purchases of these needy households.  If that is
indeed the case, the use of food stamps and other in-kind benefits may be more
desirable than other forms of assistance.
Economists have theorized, since the 1940’s, that households would spend the
same amount of additional resources on food whether these resources came from
food stamps or cash.  The one exception, according to theory, would be con-
strained households, i.e. those that receive in food stamps an amount greater than
their desired food expenditures.  Consequently, one would see a large overall food
consumption effect from food stamps only if a large proportion of households are
constrained.  However, empirically, one observes that only a small proportion of
households are constrained.  Despite this small proportion, empirical studies unani-
mously agree on the greater propensity to buy food out of food stamps rather than
cash.  Economists refer to this phenomenon as the “cash-out puzzle.”  
To explain this puzzle, we focused on the decisionmaking process within multi-
adult households. While most studies treated all food stamp households alike, we
argue that the cash-out propensity arises because food stamps and cash have differ-
ent effects on the distribution of resources within multi-adult households. We based
our analysis on a standard utility maximization approach with complete informa-
tion, in which no stigma is assumed to be attached to the use of food stamps instead
of cash. The theoretical explanation is developed through a non-cooperative game-
theoretic model of the intra-household resource allocation mechanism.
We found empirical confirmation of our argument in data from cash-out experi-
ments conducted in San Diego County, California.  Those data show no evidence
of a cash-out puzzle for single-adult households; the difference in expenditure pat-
terns is seen only in the multi-adult households.Introduction
The Food Stamp Program (FSP) is one of the largest
assistance programs in the United States.  From its
inception, this program has had an important role in
improving the nutritional status of low-income fami-
lies. An interesting puzzle brought to light by research
into the FSP is that an additional dollar of food stamps
leads to a larger increase in food consumption than an
additional dollar of cash income.  In other words, there
is a higher marginal propensity to consume food with
food stamps than with cash income.2
By contrast, the basic theoretical model of the effects
of government food subsidy on household expenditure
(Southworth, 1945) predicts such a higher marginal
propensity to consume only for households that
receive, as food stamps, an amount greater than their
desired monthly expenditure on food.  Consequently,
the model predicts large overall effects of food stamps
on food spending, relative to effects from money
income, only if a large proportion of households is
constrained, that is, they receive in food stamps an
amount greater than their desired monthly expenditure
on food. Empirical studies, however, have universally
agreed that large effects of food stamps on food spend-
ing, compared with the effect of other income, coexist
with small percentages of such constrained house-
holds.3 The large estimated marginal propensity to
consume food out of food stamps at the aggregate
level, relative to that out of cash income, therefore
seems to contradict conventional economic theory.    
This report proposes an explanation for this so-called
“cash-out puzzle.”  We question the welfare stigma-
based explanation that has been advanced by others.
Under this explanation, it is argued that individuals
incur some nonpecuniary costs from participation in
welfare programs due to social stigma attached to
receiving welfare payments.  A lump-sum cost of par-
ticipation due to such stigma has been advanced as an
explanation of why many eligible households choose
not to participate in welfare programs, such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
and the FSP.4 Levedahl (1995) has proposed a mar-
ginal version of this argument as a theoretical expla-
nation of the cash-out puzzle.  He assumes a marginal
stigma associated with food stamps in that the mar-
ginal utility of an additional dollar of food stamp ben-
efit is less than an additional dollar of cash income,
and conjectures that such marginal stigma will explain
the cash-out puzzle.  Understanding the role of stigma
in the food-purchasing decision is crucial since the
introduction of Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT)
cards (see Beecroft et al., 1994) instead of coupons is
sometimes justified by the presence of marginal and
lump-sum stigma.
We address the cash-out puzzle from a completely dif-
ferent perspective.  Standard micro-economic theory
predicts that the marginal propensities to consume
food out of cash and coupons will be identical for an
unconstrained individual.  Differences in these mar-
ginal propensities for an unconstrained household can
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Most studies show this group of constrained households to be on
the order of 5 to 15 percent.
4See, for example, Moffitt (1981 and 1983), Ranney and
Kushman (1987), and Gundersen and Andrews (2000).  Our criti-
cism of the stigma hypothesis in this report is directed at the mar-
ginal stigma concept.  We do not dispute the significant evidence
that lump-sum stigma is a major reason why many eligible house-
holds do not participate in the Food Stamp Program.be considered puzzling only in the context of the prior
assumption that a household behaves as a single indi-
vidual.  The existing literature on the cash-out puzzle
typically models the household in this fashion.  The
broad hypothesis we explore is that this particular mod-
eling strategy provides the major explanation for the
cash-out puzzle.  Specifically, we hypothesize that once
the household is modeled in a non-unitary fashion by
explicitly formulating household decisions as the out-
come of the interaction between individual members
with possibly different preferences and endowments,
the cash-out puzzle will become compatible with the
standard framework of individual decisionmaking.
To model the effect of cash-out programs on house-
hold food consumption in a non-unitary fashion, we
develop a non-cooperative, game-theoretic model of
intra-household resource allocation.  Specifically, we
propose a Cournot model of a multi-person household
in which individual food consumption has the formal
property of being a domestic public good.  In this
model, each agent takes the other agent’s spending on
food and availability of food from food stamps, as
given, and chooses the optimal allocation of his/her
own discretionary cash income between food for own
consumption, food for other members’ consumption,
and other goods.  No stigma is assumed to attach to
purchases made with food stamps.  The household
demand functions are not generated through the maxi-
mization of a single utility function, as in the standard
case, but through the Nash equilibria of the Cournot
game.  We assume that all goods are normal goods;
further, total cash income of the household is divided
between the members in such a way that any increase
in such income increases both members’ access to
cash.  We show that, in this model, if one agent
chooses not to spend any cash on food under the
coupon scheme, then, even if the household is uncon-
strained, replacement of food coupons by an equiva-
lent increase in household cash income must reduce
total household expenditure on food.  This occurs
because the change in the composition of household
income effectively alters the intra-household distribu-
tion of cash income, providing more cash to the con-
strained member of the household.  
A cash-out experiment conducted in San Diego
County allowed us to empirically test both models—
the stigma model and the intra-household bargaining
model.  In this cash-out experiment, a randomly
selected group of food stamp recipients was given cash
benefits instead of stamps.  We reject the stigma-based
explanation but find empirical confirmation for the
intra-household bargaining model.
In addition to its theoretical and empirical interest, this
puzzle has important policy implications.  The standard
model assumes equivalence between cash income and
cash transfers from government sources such as wel-
fare payments.  Given this equivalence and the small
proportion of constrained households, standard micro-
economic analysis suggests that a cash-out program,
i.e., a switch to a program of cash distributions instead
of in-kind transfers through coupons, should not make
a significant difference to food consumption at the
aggregate level.  The standard theory also predicts that
a cash-out program would lead to welfare gains for
constrained individuals.  Since food stamps and cash
transfers would be equivalent in terms of their effect on
an unconstrained recipient’s consumption, it follows
that a cash-out program would achieve welfare gains.
Furthermore, a cash-out program may generate savings
in administrative and monitoring costs.  Consequently,
a strong a priori case exists for the replacement of the
FSP by a system of cash transfers.5 To justify the pres-
ent coupon-based system, it is therefore necessary to
show that in-kind transfers influence food consumption
in a way that provides substantial additional advan-
tages.  Clearly, an understanding of the cash-out puzzle
is crucial to such an exercise.  
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5If, however, it is expensive to screen potential beneficiaries of
welfare programs, then an adverse selection problem exists in the
context of cash welfare transfers.  In this case, in-kind transfers
may be efficient since they function as a self-selection mechanism.
See, for example, Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) and Besley
and Coate (1992).Theoretical Framework
Empirical analysis of the effect of the Food Stamp
Program on household food consumption has typically
involved estimating the relationship between house-
hold expenditure on food on the one hand and total
money income and income from food stamps on the
other.  Thus, the procedure involves estimating a
demand function:
y = y(J – s, s),
where y is the total household expenditure on food, J
is the total household income from all sources, cash as
well as coupons, and s is the value of food stamps
received by the household.  The total money income
of the household is (J – s).  The cash-out puzzle is
simply the following empirical observation.  Estimates
derived from samples consisting overwhelmingly of
unconstrained households (i.e., households for whom y
> s) seem to imply that the increase in household
expenditure on food from one additional dollar’s worth
of food stamps is larger than that from one additional
dollar of cash income.  This in turn generates the fol-
lowing prediction about demand behavior by individ-
ual households.  Suppose, at some given level of total
income, J, and given some amount of food stamps, s,
we observe that the household is unconstrained.  Now
suppose household food stamp income is changed
such that total household income from all sources, J, is
invariant.  Then, at least for relatively small changes,
the household will continue to remain unconstrained
after the change.  However, a relative decrease
(increase) in the coupon component of household
income will also lead to a fall (rise) in household
expenditure on food.  Note that there is no cash-out
puzzle for constrained households; expenditure is
expected to change under a cash-out for them.  Thus,
the puzzle may be formally defined as the following
restriction on the household demand function for food.
For every J > 0, there exists a non-empty interval
(s(J),s –(J)) ￿ [0, J] such that:  (a) for all s ˛ (s(J),
s –(J)), y(J, s) > s, and (b) y is an increasing function of
s in this interval.
Our goal is to develop a model of household decision-
making that generates demand behavior in accordance
with this restriction.
In the food stamp literature, the assumption that multi-
person households behave as if they are individual
decisionmakers is ubiquitous.  As the recent literature
on intra-household decisionmaking shows, however,
this assumption is actually quite questionable.6 Intra-
household distribution of resources may depend on the
composition of total household income.  Conversion of
in-kind welfare income to cash income may simultane-
ously lead to a change in the intra-household division
of resources.  This, in turn, may lead to a multi-person
household’s exhibiting consumption behavior that
cannot be explained in terms of the household’s 
maximizing as an individual. 
We now develop an alternative theoretical explanation
of the cash-out puzzle along these lines.  This explana-
tion does not require the presence of any welfare
stigma.  We formulate our argument by means of a
Cournot model of intra-household allocation.7
The Model
Assume a household with two adult members M and
F.8  Given any agent k, k ˛ {M, F}, we shall refer to
the other agent as agent –k.  Each agent k consumes a
composite private good xk.  Each agent also derives
utility from the total household purchase (and con-
sumption) of food, y.  Agent k’s preference ordering
defined over alternative combinations of household
food purchase and the private good is represented by a
strictly quasi-concave utility function Uk(xk, y).9
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6See, for example, Alderman et al. (1955) for a survey.
7Earlier work in this tradition includes Ulph (1988), Woolley
(1988), Lundberg and Pollack (1993), Kanbur (1995), and
Dasgupta (1999).
8Generalization to a household with more than two members is
straightforward.
9It is, of course, possible that an agent’s preference ordering
over alternative combinations of the private consumption good
and total household purchase of food will depend on the intra-
household division of food as well.  We abstract from this compli-
cation.  One simple way of arriving at our formulation through
this route is to assume that intra-household distribution of food is
determined according to some sharing rule in which each agent’s
food consumption depends only on total household availability of
food.  More complicated sharing rules, while compatible with our
analysis, make the exposition cumbersome without adding any-
thing substantive to the argument.  Of course, the construction of
these sharing rules is of interest to other analyses of the Food
Stamp Program.  Furthermore, estimating such sharing rules is
nearly impossible since the data requirements would involve
detailed information about which individuals make spending deci-
sions for each good consumed by the household.Purely for notational simplicity, we shall assume that
the prices of all goods are unity.  Household availabil-
ity of food from food stamps is s, s ‡ 0.  Let the total
income of the household from all sources, cash as well
as food coupons, be J.  Then the total cash income of
the household is simply (J – s).  Each agent k has dis-
cretionary control over rk amount of cash, rk ‡ 0.
Clearly,  
rM + rF = J – s.
Member k takes the other member’s contribution to
household food purchase, y-k, and the availability of
food from food stamps, s, as given, and chooses the
allocation of his own discretionary cash income
between food (yk) and the private good, xk.  Let y be
total household expenditure on food.  By definition,
we have:
y = y-k + yk + s.
Thus, household food expenditure has the formal char-
acteristic of a domestic public good, and agents play a
Cournot game with respect to choice of contributions
toward this domestic public good.10 We assume that a
Nash equilibrium exists in this game.11
The assumption of food as a domestic public good
may appear troubling, since food is often invoked as
an example of the classic alienable good.  Note that, in
our formulation, total household food consumption has
the property of being a domestic public good only in a
purely formal, and not necessarily substantive, sense.
What we are essentially assuming is that each agent’s
preferences over alternative combinations of the pri-
vate good and household food purchase is independent
of how the total amount of food is distributed within
the household (see footnote 9).
Given total household income, its division between
cash and coupons, the division of discretionary control
over household cash income among agents, and contri-
bution toward household food purchases by the other
agent, agent k’s optimization problem is that of choos-
ing the optimal levels of y and xk, so as to maximize:
Uk(xk, y)
subject to the budget constraint:
(1) rk + y-k + s = xk + y, 
and the additional constraint:
(2) y‡ y-k + s.
The second constraint incorporates two restrictions.
First, food stamps cannot be resold for cash.12 Second,
no agent can divert money allocated by the other agent
for food purchase to his/her own private consumption.  
Then, the solution to agent k’s optimization problem,
subject to the budget constraint (1) alone, yields the
optimal levels of y and xk as functions of total income
from all sources, i.e., of [rk + s + y-k].  Let these unre-
stricted individual demand functions be given by: 
(i) y = gk(rk + s + y-k),
and
(ii) xk = hk(rk + s + y-k).
We impose the following restriction on unrestricted
individual demand functions (and thus on individual
preferences).
(A1): For all k ˛ {M, F}, gk and hk and are 
continuous and increasing in rk.
The continuity assumption, while innocuous, is essen-
tially made for convenience.  (A1) merely requires that
all goods be normal goods in the standard sense.  This
assumption suffices to ensure the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium.13 Then, the Nash equilibria yield
single-valued household demand functions:
(3) xN
k  = Xk(rk, J, s),
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12The no-resale restriction for food stamps is for convenience
and can be relaxed to allow partial, but not complete, resale.
Legally, food stamps cannot be sold for cash.
13See Bergstrom et al., 1986.
10The model can be made more realistic by allowing other pub-
lic goods (for example, expenditure on children and housing) as
well.  This, while complicating the notation, however, does not
add anything to the argument.
11See Bergstrom et al. (1986) for sufficiency conditions to
ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium.and 
(4) yN = yN
k  + yN
-k + s = Y(rk, J, s).
Since an agent can neither exchange any portion of the
food provided through food stamps for cash nor divert
the money contributed by the other agent for house-
hold food expenses to his own private consumption, it
must be the case that in any Nash equilibrium for all k
˛ {M, F},
(5) Y(rk, J, s) = max[gk(rk + s + yN
-k), s + yN
-k],
and
(6) Xk(rk, J, s) = min[hk(rk + s + yN
-k), rk].
An agent k is constrained in a Nash equilibrium if and
only if, in that Nash equilibrium,
[gk(rk + s + yN
-k) < s + yN
-k].
Clearly, this is equivalent to the requirement:
[hk(rk + s + yN
-k) > rk].
Our next assumption is simply that all adult members
of the household receive a share of any increase in
cash income of the household.
(A2): For all k ˛{M, F}, rk = rk(J – s) and is 
continuous and increasing in its argument.
(A2), (3) and (4) together imply that the household
demand functions generated by Nash equilibria can be
rewritten as functions of total income, J, and food
stamp income, s.  Thus,
xN
k  = xk(J, s);
and
yN = y(J, s). 
Our key assumption is the following:
(A3): Given any J > 0, there does not exist any 
s˛ (0, J) such that [for all k ˛{M, F}, [gk(rk(J – 
s) + s) = s]].
Suppose that the other agent spent his/her entire discre-
tionary income on his/her own private good.  Then, if
the household received s amount of food stamps, the
optimal amount of household food expenditure, from
agent k’s point of view, would be gk(rk(J – s) + s).
(A3) requires that this cannot be exactly equal to the
amount of food stamps for both agents.  This assump-
tion introduces a minimal amount of heterogeneity in
preferences and/or access to cash income between adult
members of the household.  To see how minimal such
heterogeneity is, note first that (A3) is far weaker than
the requirement that gk(rk(J – s) + s) be different for the
two agents at every possible level of food stamps.
Note further that even the latter, stronger assumption
(and hence (A3)) will be satisfied even if agents have
identical preference orderings, so long as total house-
hold cash income is divided unequally.  Conversely,
even if household cash income is divided equally, the
stronger assumption (and hence (A3)) will be satisfied
if agents have different preference orderings.  Of
course, (A3) can also be generated by differences in
both preferences and access to cash, combined in
various ways.
Proposition 1. Suppose (A1), (A2), and (A3) are sat-
isfied.  Then, given any J>0, the household demand
function for food y(J, s) must satisfy the following: 
(i) There exists s –(J)˛ (0, J) such that 
[y(J, s) > s] for all s˛[0, s –(J)),
and
[y(J, s) = s] for all s˛[s –(J), J].
(ii) There exists s(J)˛ [0, s –(J)) such that 
y(J, s) is an increasing function of s in
the interval (s(J), s –(J)).
Proof:  See the appendix.
The intuition is simply that unconstrained households
with a constrained individual will generate the cash-
out puzzle.  A numerical illustration is provided in the
appendix with the proof of proposition 1.
Suppose that a household has some arbitrary amount
of total household income, J, consisting of cash
income and food coupons.  Clearly, different combina-
tions of cash and coupons can generate J, the coupon
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[0, J].  Part (i) of proposition 1 states that, given (A1)-
(A3), the household is unconstrained if and only if the
amount of food stamps received by it is less than a
particular positive number less than J, s –(J).  Part (ii) of
proposition 1 implies that, given our assumptions,
household demand behavior must necessarily exhibit
the cash-out puzzle, as formalized above.  There must
necessarily exist a non-empty interval of food stamp
values, (s(J), s –(J)), where the marginal propensity to
consume food out of stamp income is larger than that
out of money income, despite the fact that the house-
hold is unconstrained.  In this interval, the larger the
cash component in household income, the smaller the
magnitude of household spending on food.  Any sub-
stitution of cash income by food stamps in this region
will necessarily increase household food expenditure,
while leaving the household unconstrained.  Note that
it is possible that the demand function for food will be
increasing in s throughout the interval [0, s –(J)).  Figure
1a below shows how household food expenditure will
change with changes in the coupon component of
household income in this case.
Intuitively, the mechanism generating the cash-out
puzzle in our model is the following.  Given total
household income, (A1), (A2), and (A3) together
imply that there will necessarily exist a region of val-
ues of food stamps, (s(J), s –(J)), such that, if the actual
amount of food stamps received by the household falls
in this region, then one agent will be constrained.
Furthermore, the other agent will necessarily be
unconstrained.  The unconstrained agent will con-
tribute a positive amount toward household food
expenses.  Consequently, total household food pur-
chase will be greater than the amount of food stamps,
i.e., the household will be unconstrained.  Now, con-
sider a relative increase in household cash income due
to a cashing-out of food stamps.  This makes a larger
amount of cash available to the constrained member,
allowing that member to increase his/her nonfood
expenditure.  So long as the post cash-out amount of
food stamps remains within the interval (s(J), s –(J)), the
constrained agent will continue to stay constrained,
preferring to spend all additional cash income on
his/her private good.  The unconstrained agent will
stay unconstrained; consequently, the household will
stay unconstrained as well.  The unconstrained mem-
ber of the household will increase his/her cash contri-
bution toward household food purchase to compensate
for the reduction due to the fall in the stamp component.
However, the conversion effectively reduces the total
income (cash and coupons) available to this agent.
Since household food expenditure is a normal good,
this causes the unconstrained agent to increase his/her
cash contribution by less than the magnitude of the
reduction in food stamps.  Consequently, the total food
purchase falls.  The exact opposite happens when cash
income is converted to food stamps.
If the coupon component is increased to s –(J) or
beyond, both agents and, therefore, the household will
become constrained.  On the other hand, it is possible,
but not necessary, that a large reduction in the coupon
component of household income beyond s will make
the in-kind constraint slack for the agent for whom it
was binding earlier.  In that case, both agents will
become unconstrained.  It can be easily shown that
further conversions of coupon to cash will leave
household demand invariant.  This case is depicted in
figure 1b. The marginal propensity to consume food
out of cash income is exactly the same as that out of
food stamps in the interval [0, s ^(J)). 
The critical assumption driving our results is (A3).  If
this restriction is violated, then given (A1) and (A2),









_the following can be easily established.  There will
necessarily exist some value of food stamps between
zero and J, say s ~(J), such that both agents will be con-
strained when the actual amount of food stamps
received by the household is greater than s ~(J).  Both
agents will be unconstrained when it is less.  Household
demand behavior will be exactly as predicted by the
Southworth model.  This is depicted in figure 2.  Note
that the same conclusions can be generated in essen-
tially the same way by modeling the intra-household
allocation process as a Stackelberg game. 
The model developed in this section implies that, if
the proportion of unconstrained multi-adult house-
holds with constrained individuals is significant in a
sample, then estimates derived from this sample will
yield a marginal propensity to consume food out of
food stamps significantly larger than that out of cash
income.  To seek empirical confirmation for the
model, we, therefore, need to check whether the cash-
out puzzle in the data largely arises from consumption
behavior of multi-adult households. 
In line with the standard practice in the literature, we
have treated cash income from different sources
equivalently in our model.  This was done purely for
simplicity of exposition.  The model can be easily
generalized to allow different intra-household sharing
rules for cash income arising from different sources.
Thus, for example, one may assume that cash welfare
payments and cash labor income are shared differ-
ently.  It is intuitively plausible that if households
start getting cash instead of stamps, members may
collectively decide, perhaps due to inertia, to make
only part of that additional cash available for discre-
tionary spending, while continuing to earmark the
rest for non-discretionary expenditure on food as
before, at least initially.  This can be captured in our
model at the cost of some increase in notational com-
plexity by the assumption that a welfare check
scheme increases each member’s discretionary
income by an amount less than that when cash-out
takes the form of an increase in household non-wel-
fare cash income.  It should be intuitively clear that
this version would predict a larger propensity to con-
sume food out of welfare checks than out of income.
In general, there is no strong a priori reason to
assume that the intra-household distribution of cash
would be independent of the composition of the cash-
flow with regard to its source.  Our framework is
thus consistent with differing marginal propensities
to consume food for cash from different sources.  On


















ˆthe other hand, our model would be decisively
refuted if it can be shown that the marginal propen-
sity to consume food out of cash income, whether
from welfare payments or otherwise, is higher than
that out of food stamps.
Analysts have conjectured that while food stamps are
not targeted toward women per se, since women are
the main food purchasers, the delivery mechanism cre-
ates an entitlement (in the sense of a right-of-control
acknowledged by other household members) to such
transfers, unlike cash transfers (Alderman et al., 1997,
p. 278).14 To the extent that this suggestion implies
that a significant proportion of cash welfare transfers
may be controlled by men, an assumption formalized
in (A2) earlier in this section, it is intuitively plausible.
It is, however, difficult to see what the notion of enti-
tlement (i.e., effective control) implies in this context,
unless one also assumes resale possibility for food
coupons.  Otherwise, since de facto property rights
over food coupons can be exercised only through pur-
chase of food, in terms of household food expenditure,
it does not matter which member has such property
rights (though this may influence its composition).
Note that in our model, the cash-out puzzle arises
independently of any assumption about the intra-
household division of control over food stamps.  Note
also that the conjecture that men control the entire
amount of any cash welfare transfer by itself does not
explain the cash-out puzzle, unless it is additionally
assumed that men do not contribute to the domestic
purchase of food.  Indeed, it is intuitively clear and
can be shown formally that, with identical preferences,
women will be sole contributors to household food
purchases only if they earn significantly more than
men.  If, instead, women earn significantly less, they
may not contribute any part of their personal income
toward food purchases, choosing to use only the
money allocated by men and the available amount of
food stamps, even if they are solely responsible for the
actual shopping and preparation of food.  In that case,
if men control the entire amount of any cash welfare
transfer, a cash-out will in fact leave household pur-
chase of food invariant. 
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14“Entitlement” is sometimes used to describe programs from
which any eligible recipient is entitled to receive benefits.  The
Food Stamp Program is one such program while, for example,
housing assistance programs are rationed such that some eligible
households cannot receive benefits.  The meaning of “entitlement”
here is quite different, and we trust that the reader will not confuse
the two definitions.The Data
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food and
Nutrition Service undertook four experiments in the
late 1980’s in which food stamp participants were
given cash instead of the traditional coupons.  These
experiments were conducted in San Diego County,
California, Alabama, and Washington State.15 In this
report, we use data from the cash-out experiment in
San Diego County.  Despite being a rich source of
data, this particular data set has been used very little in
analyses of the FSP.  
For the cash-out experiment, 600 families were
selected at random from the food stamp-receiving pop-
ulation and their benefits were converted from
coupons to checks.  An additional 600 families, who
continued to receive benefits in the form of coupons,
were selected as a control and comparison group.16
The families were interviewed twice several months
after the cash-out was implemented.17 Unlike other
studies of food stamp participant behavior, the food
stamp benefit data are taken from program records and
matched with survey participants.18 In this report, we
will refer to food purchased at a store for preparation
and eating at home as food expenditure.19 This one-
time survey of participants does not allow us to follow
families who have switched from stamps to checks.
However, since the participants in the program were
selected at random, comparison across the group of
households that received checks and those that
received stamps may give some preliminary indication
of the presence of the cash-out puzzle (Fraker, Martini,
and Ohls, 1995).  
Economic Research Service/USDA Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle / FANRR-12  9
15The cash-out experiments are described in Fraker, Martini,
and Ohls (1995) and Carlson (1993).  These were the first large-
scale experiments replacing food stamps with cash to be con-
ducted in the United States.  Previous cash-out experiments were
conducted in Puerto Rico since 1982 and in portions of Utah and
Vermont in 1981.  Unfortunately, the results from these experi-
ments appear to have limited applicability to the U.S. population
as a whole (see Butler, Ohls, and Posner (1985) and Devaney and
Fraker (1986)).
16We restrict our sample to observations where the reported size
of the household unit is the same as the number of people who
appear on the roster of household members. Without such a
restriction, the age proportion variables (described later) will not
sum to one.  This procedure eliminates 101 households from the
analysis.  To include these households, one would need to either
assume that the observed age proportion fractions are representa-
tive of the household members not listed in the roster or construct
new household size variables different from those reported by
respondents.  Exploring these auxiliary assumptions is beyond the
scope of this report.  In addition, we deleted observations for
group homes and homeless households, as well as observations
with invalid/old food data.
17The initial interview consisted of detailed explanation of the
questionnaire and purpose of the study.  The follow-up interview
was conducted to verify that all food purchases and consumption
data for the survey week were correctly provided.  Follow-up was
done within 1 week of completion of the survey to ensure partici-
pants’ability to recall the necessary information.
18While this eliminates problems of misreporting of food
stamp benefits, misreporting of other income is still likely to
occur in the data.
19This somewhat restricted definition approximately matches
the purpose of the FSP, which is to provide income for families to
purchase groceries that they will use for meal preparation at home.
We have used a variable constructed from food used during the
week, based upon purchase price and quantities reported by
respondents.  We have not included home-produced food and gift
food, which are not important in this sample.  Adding these quan-
tities to our food expenditure variable does not change any of the
results reported here.  One anomaly is that food expenditure also
includes take-away food brought back to the house for consump-
tion.  This does not have any effect on our analysis.Results
The check and stamp households resemble each other
in most respects (see app. table 1).  Table 1 presents
the difference in mean weekly food expenditure
between the two groups.20
Whether we normalize expenditure by adult male
equivalent21 for calorie intake or by the size of the
food consumption unit, we see a significant differ-
ence in total food expenditure between the two
groups of households.  Only about 5 percent of the
households had higher food stamp allotments than
food expenditures.  Thus, we would not expect the
measurable difference in food expenditure to be
caused by the elimination of the constraint for the
check-receiving households.
Another way of verifying the presence of the cash-out
puzzle in these data is to consider the marginal
propensity to consume out of stamps and compare it
with that out of income.  We can estimate these param-
eters through estimation of the Engel curve for food
expenditure.  Other authors (for example, Levedahl,
1995) have used this approach, but we feel it deserves
further explanation.  The point of our econometric
estimation is to map the expansion path of food expen-
diture that arises from the utility-maximizing behavior
of agents.  At different income and benefit levels, we
estimate the optimal choice of food expenditure.  The
problem that arises is that individuals who receive
food benefits in the form of food stamps are facing a
kinked budget constraint.  Stamp-receiving individuals
who are observed to be on the kink (food expenditure
equal to food stamp benefits) or on the flat portion of
the budget constraint (food expenditure less than food
stamp benefits) are not at an optimal point for their
income level.  These constrained individuals presum-
ably would change their behavior if the food stamp
benefit were changed to cash/check.  
The Engel curve we wish to estimate is one that traces
out a behavioral relationship.  The behavioral relation-
ship for constrained and unconstrained individuals is
thus clearly different.  In the former, optimization is
constrained, whereas for the latter it is unconstrained.
Furthermore, the cash-out puzzle refers only to the
behavior of unconstrained individuals.  There is no
cash-out puzzle for constrained individuals—expendi-
ture is expected to change under cash-out for these
individuals.  Therefore, the Engel curves we wish to
estimate are those of unconstrained stamp households.  
Appendix table 2 provides a comparison of the con-
strained and unconstrained households.  The con-
strained households tend to be much poorer, perhaps
indicating that the constraint arises not so much from
differences in taste as from a tighter budget
constraint.22 According to the conventional theory, we
would expect the marginal propensity to consume food
out of food stamps for unconstrained households to be
equal to that out of cash income.  (This is due to the
fact that unconstrained households can substitute food
coupons for cash expenditure on food and switch the
cash expenditure to other goods.  This is precisely the
kind of optimization decision that constrained house-
holds cannot make.)  A difference in these two mar-
ginal propensities would provide further evidence of
the presence of the cash-out puzzle in these data.  
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20For all parameter estimates in the report, * and ** indicate
significance at the 90- and 95-percent confidence levels.  Numbers
in parentheses below coefficient estimates are standard errors,
except where otherwise indicated.
21We use household size measured in equivalent nutrition units
for food energy, an adult equivalent adjusted for guest meals and
number of meals eaten at home.  The meals are similar to those
reported by Fraker, Martini, and Ohls (1995) when it appears that
they use this particular normalization.
22If differences in tastes were determining constrained/uncon-
strained households, we would expect to see at least some wealth-
ier households in the constrained group of households.  As it is,
we only see poor households.  Of course, since stamp benefits and
income are inversely related, we would expect the constraint to be
more important for poorer households.
Table 1—Food expenditure for stamp and check
households
Weekly food  Weekly food
expenditure per expenditure per 
member of the food adult male
Item consumption unit equivalent
Stamp households $21.38 $35.49
Check households $20.23 $33.14
Difference -$1.15* -$2.34**
(Test statistic) (-1.84) (-2.18)
Notes: * indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the
90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statisti-
cally significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer
Service (currently Food and Nutrition Service).Many different functional forms have been used to
estimate Engel curves for food expenditure.  Here, we
consider the following three models:
(a) fexpi = a + byi + g fsbi + Xi’d,
(b) ln(fexpi) = a + b ln(yi + g fsbi) + Xi’d, and
(c) ln(fexpi) = a + b ln(yi + fsbi) + g     fsbi  + Xi’d,
(yi + fsbi)
where fexp is food expenditure, y is cash income, fsb is
stamp benefits, and X is a vector of household charac-
teristics.23
To check for the correct functional form, we first
impose the condition that food stamps and coupon
benefits have the same effect on food expenditure.
(This is equivalent to setting g = b in model (a), g = 1
in model (b), and g = 0 in model (c).)  We then esti-
mate the bi-variate regression of food expenditure per
person on total income per person.  We also show the
results of including household size as an explanatory
variable.  These results, presented in table 2, clearly
show the importance of returns to scale in household
food purchasing and preparation.  For the double-log
model, we get a marginal propensity to consume food
out of total income of 0.067, measured at median values
of income and food expenditure.  This result is similar
to the linear model and is in line with previous surveys.
Figure 3 shows nonparametric regression results for the
linear and double-log specifications.  The graphs show
fitted values of the regression function for values of
per-person income between the first and 99th per-
centiles of income.  The regression function is calcu-
lated using Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression, and the
bandwidth is chosen by leave-one-out cross-validation,
which minimizes the sum of squared prediction errors.24
Both specifications show some signs of nonlinearity.
For larger values of income, we observe the decreas-
ing marginal propensity to consume, including one
range that appears to be slightly negative.  We did fit a
quadratic expenditure system to the data but are unable
to reject that the coefficient on income squared is zero.
The double-log specification shows moderate signs of
nonlinearity, again particularly at larger values of
income.  For both specifications, the relationship
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24Tail values were used in regression calculations but were dis-
carded from the graph.  See Härdle (1990) for details of nonpara-
metric regression analysis.  Our method tends to undersmooth
somewhat, but we feel that it is easier for the reader to correct this
with the eye than to unsmooth an overly smoothed curve.
23The linear model (a) is the only one of the three that is consis-
tent with utility maximization; however, models (b) and (c) give a
better fit for most data.  The linear model does not allow for a
decreasing share of food expenditure in total expenditure at higher
income levels, an empirical regularity observed in nearly all con-
sumer expenditure surveys.  Model (b) is used by Moffitt (1989),
while Senauer and Young (1986) and Levedahl (1995) employ
model (c); both allow the share of food stamps in total income to
affect food expenditure.  Levedahl (1995) discusses these and
other models and shows that model (c) provides the greatest
degree of flexibility, imposing few restrictions on the relationships
between the marginal propensities to consume out of stamps and
income and their rates of change.
Table 2—San Diego cash-out experiment: Unconstrained households
Unconstrained, stamp households
(n = 487)
Model (a) (b) (c)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash and benefit income per household member 0.091** 0.056** 0.369** 0.228**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.042) (0.045)
Household size -1.631** -.342**
(.272) (.049)
Constant 14.704** 23.298** 1.403** 2.409**
(1.022) (1.740) (.175) (.220)
Adjusted R2 .0804 .1421 .1335 .2118
Notes: These are the coefficient estimates from models (a), (b), and (c). The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the variable is
statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
(currently Food and Nutrition Service).seems linear for the bulk of the data.  In analyzing our
estimates, we shall keep figure 3 in mind.  Neither
nonparametric regression accounts for the full set of
explanatory variables considered later in this report.
We now estimate all three models, using a full range
of explanatory variables to control for receipt of other
food subsidies, household composition, and household
characteristics.  In the appendix, we discuss some sen-
sitivity analyses that we conducted.  Regardless of the
choice of model, the cash-out puzzle remains clearly
visible in the data.  A significant difference exists
between the marginal propensities to consume out of
cash income and food coupons, even for those house-
holds unconstrained in their food-purchasing behav-
ior.  Table 3 presents the results from the regression,
using a complete matrix of explanatory variables for
the linear model.  We also show the results imposing
the constraint that the effect of cash income and
stamp benefits be equal.  This is clearly rejected by an
F-test of equality of the coefficients on cash income
and stamp benefits.  
We scale the food expenditure and income quantities
by household size rather than by using an equivalence
scale.  We then include variables to control for the per-
centage of household members in different age groups,
who, presumably, have different nutritional needs.25
Table 4 presents results from regressions, using the
double-log models (b) and (c).  Again, the marginal
propensities to consume out of stamps and income are
found to be significantly different.  The results from
the two models are quite similar.
Levedahl (1995) estimates model (c) with a slightly
different specification and a slightly different sample
of the same data set.  Qualitatively, his results are sim-
ilar to those shown here, though our results show
slightly larger marginal propensities to consume from
both coupons and cash income.  
In summary, in line with other studies, marginal
propensities to consume out of cash income and food
stamps are significantly different for unconstrained
households in our data set.  Thus, the cash-out puzzle
seems to be robustly present in the data.  Furthermore,
the results are robust to choice of functional form and
the nonparametric regressions seem to lend support to
either the linear or double-log relationship for the bulk
of the data.
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25The primary reason we choose to follow this approach is that
it is not at all clear what type of equivalent scale should be used
for total household food expenditure.  In much of the food stamp
literature, the adult male equivalent for calories is used to weight
total food expenditure.  We feel that this is inappropriate, since
providing for energy needs is only one small part of overall food
expenditure and allowing age proportions to directly affect total
food expenditure is a more reasonable modeling assumption.
20
3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8













San Diego cash-out: Unconstrained stamp


















































































Total household income per person
Dollars per month
Dollars per month
Log of total household income per person
Linear specification
Double-log specificationEconomic Research Service/USDA Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle / FANRR-12  13
Table 4—San Diego Cash-Out Experiment:




Cash and benefit income  0.388**
per household member (0.059)
b in model (b) 0.383**
(0.059)
g in model (b) 7.850**
(2.383)
Proportion of food stamp benefits 1.068**
in total cash and benefit income  (.260)
Log of household size -.326** -.323**
(.076) (.076)
Money value of gifts of food  .030** .030**
per household member (.010) (.010)
In-kind food commodity donations  -.024 -.024
per household member (.017) (.017)
Breakfast subsidy per  .003 .003
household member (.018) (.018)
Lunch subsidy per  .021** .021**
household member (.007) (.007)
Female-headed household -.032 -.032
(.057) (.057)
Weekly meals eaten as guest  -.054** -.054**
per household member (.009) (.009)
Weekly meals eaten by guests  .037** .036**
per household member (.006) (.006)
Proportion of households with  .165 .231
child(ren) age 0 to 1  (.195) (.193)
Proportion of households with .328** .375**
child(ren) age 2 to 17  (.161) (.158)
Proportion of households with .023 -.071
member(s) over age 60  (.242) (.242)
Constant 1.389** 1.431**
(.333) (.316)
Adjusted R2 .3574 .3470
MPC out of income .062** .076**
(.018) (.013)
MPC out of stamps .487** .395**
(.142) (.078)
MPC out of stamps -  .425** .319**
MPC out of income (.137) (.074)
Notes:The standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors for
the nonlinear model (b) are calculated with bootstrap. * indicates that
the variable is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level;
** indicates the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent con-
fidence level. MPC denotes the marginal propensity to consume.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer
Service (currently Food and Nutrition Service).
Table 3—San Diego Cash-Out Experiment:
Coefficient estimates for linear model
Unconstrained stamp households
(n = 487)
Model (a)  with g = b (a)
Cash and benefit income 0.053**
per household member (0.014)
Cash income per 0.051**
household member (0.014)
Food stamp benefit per  .419**
household member (.132)
Household size -1.457** -1.165**
(.346) (.359)
Money value of gifts of food  .718** .705**
per household member (.232) (.231)
In-kind food commodity donations -.799** -.741**
per household member (.380) (.378)
Breakfast subsidy per  .216 .175
household member (.409) (.406)
Lunch subsidy per  .405** .442**
household member (.163) (.162)
Female-headed household .525 .701
(1.181) (1.174)
Weekly meals eaten as guest  -1.196** -1.191**
per household member (.191) (.190)
Weekly meals eaten by guests 1.035** 1.039**
per household member (.137) (.136)
Proportion of households with  -1.947 -2.220
child(ren) age 0 to 1  (4.109) (4.081)
Proportion of households with  .244 -.319
child(ren) age 2 to 17  (3.175) (3.159)
Proportion of households with  -6.128 -3.835
member(s) over age 60  (5.373) (5.398)
Constant 22.880** 19.174**
(2.121) (2.489)
Adjusted R2 .2848 .2949
Notes: The dependent variable is per-person food expenditure. The
standard errors are in parentheses. The first column imposes the
restriction that cash income and food stamps have the same effect
on food expenditure. * indicates that the variable is statistically sig-
nificant at the 90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the vari-
able is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer
Service (currently Food and Nutrition Service).Stigma Reconsidered
Moffitt (1983) found that stigma was associated with
enrolling in Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) but, not surprisingly (since AFDC benefits
were paid in cash), stigma did not vary with benefit
levels.  In other words, throughout the FSP literature,
the common argument is that benefits that look like
cash should be treated like cash.  Thus, we take steps
to verify that the check-receiving households indeed
treat their food benefits like cash income.  If they do
not, this would provide evidence against the stigma
hypothesis.  Table 5 presents a summary of results for
this comparison.  
In the sample with check- and stamp-receiving house-
holds, we include a dummy variable for stamp-receiv-
ing households and interact this dummy variable with
the income, stamp benefit, and household size vari-
ables.  We fail to reject the hypothesis that the mar-
ginal propensities to consume between the stamp and
check groups are different.  The intercept dummy is
significant and positive (consistent with table 1).  Full
regression results are presented in appendix tables 7
and 8.
Check households treat their check benefits like
stamps in a significantly different way than they treat
cash income.  This finding contradicts the stigma
hypothesis, or at a minimum, indicates that the stigma
hypothesis by itself is insufficient to explain the puz-
zle.  Now we turn to an explanation that we find more
compelling, that the puzzle is driven by intra-house-
hold dynamics.
Intra-Household Resource Allocations
The major prediction of the model developed previ-
ously is that multi-adult and single-adult unconstrained
households may have different consumption patterns.
Multi-adult households may exhibit larger marginal
propensity to consume food out of coupons than out of
cash.  However, single-adult households should not
exhibit the cash-out puzzle.  The marginal stigma-
based explanation formalized in the Theoretical
Framework section, however, predicts that if nonfood
items taken together constitute a normal good, then
single-adult households should exhibit the cash-out
puzzle.  This difference then provides a way of empiri-
cally evaluating the two competing hypotheses.  We,
therefore, estimate both pooled and separate Engel
curves for multi- and single-adult households, using
models (a) and (c) and the specification developed ear-
lier in this section of the report.  The results are pre-
sented in table 6.  We include a dummy variable for
single-adult households and interact it with the income
and food benefit variables.  Using an F-test, we reject
the poolability of these two samples.  In other words,
the relationship between cash income, benefit income,
and food expenditure is significantly different for the
single- and multiple-adult households. 
Full regression results are provided in appendix tables
4 and 5.  These results come from estimating separate
regressions for the two subsets of data.  Using interac-
tive dummy variables,  imposing identical response
coefficients for the household characteristic variables,
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Table 5—Is stigma the explanation?  Unconstrained




Model (n = 953) (n = 487) (n = 466)
Linear model:
MPC(Y) 0.046** 0.051** 0.037**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
MPC(FSB) .318** .416** .221*
(.089) (.132) (.122)
MPC(FSB) -  .272** .365** .184
MPC(Y) (.089) (.132) (.122)
Double-log model:
MPC(Y) .307** .393** .235**
(.057) (.078) (.084)
MPC(FSB) .069** .075** .063**
(.010) (.013) (.014)
MPC(FSB) - 
MPC(Y) .238** .318** .172**
(.053) (.074) (.078)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of
income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out
of food stamp (check) benefits. The standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. * indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 90-
percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically
significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer
Service (currently Food and Nutrition Service).Economic Research Service/USDA Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle / FANRR-12  15
and using sparser specifications lead to quantitatively
similar results.  (These results are also included in the
appendix.)  Appendix tables 5 and 6 provide results for
only those families with children.  Since these make
up the bulk of our sample, the results are essentially
unchanged.  The substantive conclusions are the same.
The low marginal propensities to consume for single-
adult headed households are surprising.  Within our
model, we control for many differences between single-
and multi-adult households.   Appendix table 9 provides
a comparison of the single- and multi-adult households.
As seen in this table, in comparison with multi-adult
households, single-adult households have lower average
incomes and lower monthly food expenditures; are more
likely to eat as a guest in someone else’s household and
less likely to have guests; have higher education levels;
lower household size; and fewer people over the age of
51.  While we control for many of these differences in
our model, differences over unobserved variables may
lead to the low marginal propensities to consume.  As an
example, in addition to lower average incomes, single-
adult households are more likely to have longer spells of
poverty (Rodgers and Rodgers, 1992).  These longer
poverty spells may lead to different budgeting rules that
underlie the low marginal propensities to consume.  As
another example, Gleason, Schochet, and Moffitt (1998)
showed that single-adult households have substantially
longer food stamp participation spells than other house-
holds.  Longer food stamp participation spells may lead
to households setting their food expenditures more
closely to the food stamp allotment and using any devia-
tion from this amount for nonfood expenditures, result-
ing in low marginal propensities to consume.
Regardless of the specification used, the regression
results unambiguously confirm the main prediction of
the model presented above and run counter to the pre-
diction generated from the stigma-based explanation.
Though all nonfood items taken together constitute a
normal good, there is no evidence of a cash-out puzzle
for single-adult headed households.  The difference in
expenditure patterns in the aggregate is completely
explained by the consumption behavior of multi-adult
households.  Clearly, further empirical exploration of
this difference between multi- and single-adult headed
households is needed.  The results here provide strong
encouragement to explore this explanation of the cash-
out puzzle.
Table 6—San Diego Cash-Out Experiment: Single
and multi-adult headed households compared
All stamp Multi-adult Single-adult
Model households households households
Linear model:
MPC(Y) 0.051** 0.071** 0.017
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
MPC(FSB) .419** .687** .030
(.132) (.224) (.180)
MPC(FSB) -  .367**  .616**  .013
MPC(Y) (.131) (.224) (.180)
Double-log model:
MPC(Y) .076** .108** .009
(.013) (.018) (.020)
MPC(FSB) .395** .526** .073
(.078) (.107) (.114)
MPC(FSB) -  .319**  .418**  .064
MPC(Y) (.074) (.103) (.107)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of
income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out
of food stamp (check) benefits. The standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. * indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 90-
percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically
significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer
Service (currently Food and Nutrition Service).Conclusion
As previous analysts have demonstrated, there appears
to be a large discrepancy between the marginal
propensity to purchase food out of cash income and
that out of food stamps.  In this report, we have
advanced the hypothesis that the cash-out puzzle can
be explained in terms of the differential effect of food
stamp and cash income on intra-household distribution
of resources within multi-adult households.  We have
developed this hypothesis formally through a Cournot
model of the intra-household resource allocation
mechanism in which total household food availability
has the formal characteristic of a domestic public
good.  In this model, even if the household is uncon-
strained in its food expenditure, a replacement of food
stamps by an equivalent increase in the cash income of
the household may reduce total household expenditure
on food.  This occurs because when an individual
member is constrained, increase in household cash
income provides more cash to the constrained member.
The model predicts that only multi-adult unconstrained
households may exhibit larger marginal propensity to
consume food out of coupons as compared with cash. 
Our empirical results, using data from cash-out experi-
ments conducted in San Diego County, are consistent
with the theoretical predictions of our model.  There
seems to be no evidence of a cash-out puzzle for sin-
gle-adult headed households, and the difference in
expenditure patterns is completely explained by the
multi-adult households.  Our empirical results thus
cast doubt on the appropriateness of the marginal
stigma hypothesis as an explanation for the cash-out
puzzle.  An important extension of this research is to
verify that this difference in marginal propensities
between single- and multi-adult households is
observed in other data sets.  It would be of particular
interest to examine this issue using data from after the
passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act.
The basic issue we raised in this report is whether the
cash-out puzzle is largely a phenomenon confined to
households with multiple decisionmakers.  We pro-
vided some grounds, theoretical as well as empirical,
as to why this may indeed be the case.  We agree with
others about the need for more systematic empirical
exploration of this question.26 The initial results 
indicate that exploring the relationship between the
composition of household income and intra-household
distribution of access to resources may explain the
cash-out puzzle.  This explanation has implications for
policymakers.  If the cash-out puzzle is primarily man-
ifest in multi-adult households, any switch to cash
away from food stamps (or in-kind programs more
generally) may result in reduced food intakes by a
readily identifiable group of households.  This pro-
vides a justification for the use of in-kind benefits.  If
intra-household dynamics lead to children’s receiving
more food when the benefit is in the form of food
stamps than in the form of cash, this provides a com-
pelling reason for the use of in-kind benefits.    
In this report, we have considered only the effect of
stigma on total food expenditure.  There may be other
marginal stigma effects that do not cause changes in
food expenditure.  Wilde and Ranney (2000) and
Beecroft et al. (1994) suggest that benefit recipients
make more trips to the store when they receive checks
or electronic debit cards instead of food stamps.  This
may, perhaps, be interpreted as evidence of stigma.
Alternately, it may be that people do not like to hold
food coupons, a highly liquid asset, because of the risk
of theft, or more frequent trips to the store may mean
that recipients are buying more perishable food such as
fruits and vegetables that may provide better nutritive
value.  One interesting extension of this report would
be to consider differences in nutrition elasticities for
cash and benefit income. 
16  Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle / FANRR-12 Economic Research Service/USDA
26Wilde and Ranney (1996) also urge further exploration of this
issue.  Montalto (1992) considers the issue in a cooperative bar-
gaining framework.References
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We shall establish proposition 1 with the following
two lemmas.
Lemma N1
(A1) and (A2) together imply that for every k ˛{M, F}
and for every J > 0, there exists a unique Sk(J), such
that [gk(rk(J – Sk(J)) + Sk(J)) = Sk (J)].  Furthermore, 
(a)   Sk(J)˛(0, J),
(b)   [gk(rk(J – s) + s) > s] for all s˛(0, Sk(J)),
and
(c)   [gk(rk(J – s) + s) < s] for all s˛(Sk, J].
Proof of Lemma N1
Consider any J > 0 and any k ˛{M, F}.  First note that
since the private good is normal by (A1) and [rk(0) =
0], it must be the case that for s = J we have:
[gk(J) < J].
For s = 0, since rk(J) > 0 by (A2), it follows from (A1)
that:
[gk(rk(J)) > 0].
(A2) implies that [rk(J – s) + s] is continuous and
increasing in s.  Then, noting that, by (A1), gk is con-
tinuous and increasing in its argument, Lemma N1 is
immediate. 
Lemma N2
Given any J > 0, consider any s*, s ^˛[0, J].  Suppose
[y(J, s*) > s*] and for some k ˛{M, F}, [y(J, s*) >
gk(rk(J – s*) + y(J, s*))].  Then, given (A1) and (A2), 
if [s* < s ^], then [y(J, s ^) > y(J, s*)].
Proof of Lemma N2
Denote all Nash equilibrium variables under s* and s ^
by the corresponding superscripts * and ^, respec-
tively.  Suppose [y* > s*] and for some  k ˛{M, F}, [y*
> gk(rk(J – s*) + y*)].  Then, in light of (5) and (6), it is
clear that [y*
-k > 0] and [y*
k = 0].  Suppose [s* < s ^] but 
(X1) y ^ £ y*.
Since, by assumption [y*
-k > 0], using (5), we have:
(X2) y* = g-k(r-k(J – s*) + s* + y*
k).
From (5) we also get,
(X3) g-k(r-k(J – s ^) + s ^ + y ^
k) £ y ^. 
Then, since g-k is increasing in its argument, (X1),
(X2), and (X3) together imply:
(X4) [r-k(J – s*) + s* + y*
k] ‡ [r-k(J – s ^) + s ^ + y ^
k].
Now since rk is increasing in its argument by (A2),
(X4) implies:
(X5) y*
k > y ^
k. 
Since by assumption y*
k = 0, (X5) involves a contradic-
tion, which establishes Lemma N2.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let J > 0 be some arbitrary amount of total household
income.  By Lemma N1(a), there exists for all k ˛{M,
F}, Sk (J)˛(0, J) such that: 
(X6) [Sk(J) = gk(rk(J – Sk(J)) + Sk(J))]. 
Let: 
(X7) S ¯¯(J) = max{Sk(J), S-k(J)}. 
In light of (X6), to establish part (i) of Proposition 1, it
is sufficient to show that: 
(X8) [y(J, s) > s] for all s ˛[0, S ¯¯(J)),
and
(X9) [y (J, s) = s] for all s ˛[S S ¯¯(J), J]. 
Lemma N1(b) immediately implies (X8).  Now, by
Lemma N1(c),
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s ˛(S ¯¯(J), J].  
Since the private good is a normal good, it follows
that: 
(X10)for all k ˛{M, F}, [y > gk(rk(J – s) + 
s+ y-k)], for all s ˛S ¯¯(J), J]. 
Noting that, by construction, [y(J, S ¯¯(J)) =S ¯¯(J)],
(X10) yields (X9).  This establishes part (i) of
Proposition 1.
Let S(J) = min{S ¯¯ k (J), S ¯¯ -k (J)}.  By (X6) and (A3), we
have:
S(J)˛[0, S S ¯¯(J)),
where S ¯¯(J) is defined by (X7) above.
Hence, to establish part (ii) of Proposition 1, it suffices
to show that:
(X11) y(J, s) is an increasing function of s in the 
interval (S(J), S S ¯¯(J)). 
From (X8) above, we have: 
(X12)[y(J, s) > s] for all s ˛(S(J), S S ¯¯(J)). 
By Lemma N1(c), we have:
for some k ˛{M, F}, [[s > gk(rk(J – s) + s)]
for all s ˛(S(J), J].  
Since the private good is normal by (A1), it follows
immediately that: 
(X13)for some k ˛{M, F}, [[y(J, s) > gk(rk(J – s)
+ y(J, s))] for all s ˛(S(J), S S ¯¯(J))]. 
In light of Lemma N2, (X12) and (X13) together
imply (X11).  This completes the proof of part (ii) of
Proposition 1. 
Illustration of Proposition 1
Consider two agents, M and F with utility functions:
UM(xM, y) = ln(y)+xM and
UF(xF, y) = (xFy)0.5,
with household resources IM = 10, IF = 10, T = 0, and
S = 4.  Let prices for both goods equal 1, and let the
consumption of the other agent not enter the utility
function of each agent for simplicity.  Treating the
stamp income as cash income and letting each agent
have exclusive control over her/his resources, it is easy
to show that agent M would choose (1, 13) and agent
F would choose (7, 7), when the first number is the
amount spent on food and the second is the amount
spent on the private consumption good.
The Nash equilibrium will have: 
(a)  consistency of beliefs about other agent’s 
contribution to y, and 
(b)  y ‡ S + y-k.
It is easy to see that (b) will be binding for agent M,
and thus he will not contribute to food purchases for
the household.  F will then choose to allocate (7, 7).
This is an unconstrained household in which food
expenditure is greater than stamp income (S = 4, FE =
7) with a constrained individual, M.
What would happen under a cash-out?  Assume
agents F and M, each getting half of the cash transfer.
Now, M would choose (1, 11) and agent F would
choose (6, 6).  
The Nash equilibrium allocations would be:
M:  (0, 12) and
F:  (6, 6).
Thus, the household is unconstrained, but food expen-
diture decreases when benefits are cashed out.
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Regressions
To determine which variables to include in the regres-
sion and to test the sensitivity of our models, we esti-
mated both models for: (1) the full check and stamp
data set; (2) the full data set, using interactive dummies
for the stamp recipients; (3) only the check households;
and (4) only the unconstrained stamp households.  We
also conducted these four regressions, using only sin-
gle-adult headed households.  Any variable significant
in one of these regressions was included in all the
regressions for the sake of completeness and compari-
son.  (The dummy variable for Asian head of house-
hold was included only in the check/stamp comparison
since it was never significant for any of the stamp sub-
samples.)  The point was not to necessarily come up
with the best model, but to show that the results are
robust to specification and variable inclusion.
Furthermore, we feel that it is important to include
variables for which a strong a priori reason exists for
that variable to influence the dependent variable.  We
have resisted the temptation to further pare down the
model or to drop variables with unexpected signs.
We report pooled and separate regressions for most
regressions.  There are no contradictions between the
sign or approximate magnitude of any of the control
variables we considered across these various regres-
sions.  Thus, our results seem quite robust to dividing
the sample in various ways.
Gift income is the only variable that seems to differ-
ently affect the check and stamp households.  For the
stamp households, the sign is opposite of that which we
would expect.  When the sample is pooled, this vari-
able is insignificant.  Dropping this variable had no
effect on the marginal propensity to consume out of
food stamps or income or on any substantive result.
Lunch subsidies were, surprisingly, positively related to
food expenditure for all groups.  This was consistent
for every subsample of data.  It could reflect an effect
on preference development or taste for certain kinds of
food that may increase family food expenditure.  The
age proportion variables was generally significant only
for the double-log model.  The higher the proportion in
the 2- to 17-year age range, the higher the expenditure
on food.  This may reflect a focus on nutrition for chil-
dren or the effects of advertising and peer pressure.
We tested several different ways of separating the age
ranges and this did not affect the main results.   We
also tested definition of food stamp benefit variables,
income variables, and the definition of single- and mul-
tiple-adult families.  Our results are robust for any rea-
sonable definition of these variables.
We also explored the possibility of measurement error in
the reported food expenditure data.  It could be that there
are many households considered unconstrained that are
in fact constrained and clustered very close to the kink in
the budget constraint.  We allowed for food expenditure
to be overstated by 5 and 10 percent and re-estimated the
model, using that data to form the constraint.  There was
only 1 household within 5 percent of being constrained
and less than 20 within 10 percent.  We estimated the
model after re-classifying these 20 households, but there
was no effect on the results.
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Appendix table 1—Comparison of stamp and check households
Received Received
Item stamps checks
Sample size 510 467
Monthly cash income ($) 891 907
Monthly food stamp benefit ($) 116 117
Benefits as proportion of income (%) 13.7 13.9
Monthly food expenditure ($) 310 284
Households with WIC vouchers (%) 11.8 13.7
Average amount ($) 60 52
Households with school breakfast (%) 19.2 20.1
Average amount ($) 30 32
Households with school lunch subsidy (%) 50.0 50.5
Average amount ($) 56 58
Weekly average number of meals eaten as guest per household member 2.36 2.26
Weekly average number of meals eaten by guests per household member 3.66 2.92
Information on household head:
Employed (%) 13.1 13.5
Hispanic (%) 32.9 32.8
Black (%) 22.4 18.2
Married (%) 22.4 24.2
Widowed (%) 2.9 3.6
Divorced (%) 19.4 19.5
Legally separated (%) 17.8 14.1
Completed high school (%) 58.8 56.5
Own home/pay mortgage (%) 1.0 1.3
Household information:
Average size 3.9 3.6
Percentage of households with--
Child(ren) 95.1 93.1
One adult 59.0 60.4
Female head 76.1 76.4
Single parent with child(ren) 56.3 57.0
Percentage of households with--
Child(ren) age 0 to 11 85.7 84.4
Child(ren) age 12 to 17 30.8 30.8
Member(s) over age 51 13.1 11.6
Average number of children for households with children 2.5 2.3
Notes: WIC is the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
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Appendix table 2—Comparison of stamp households: Constrained and unconstrained
All stamp 
Item households Constrained Unconstrained
Sample size 510 23 487
Monthly cash income ($) 891 700 900
Monthly food stamp benefit ($) 116 141 115
Benefits as proportion of income (%) 13.7 21.3 13.3
Monthly food expenditure ($) 310 109 320
Households with WIC vouchers (%) 11.8 17.4 11.5
Average amount ($) 60 67 60
Households with school breakfast (%) 19.2 17.4 19.3
Average amount ($) 30 44 30
Households with school lunch subsidy (%) 50.0 34.8 50.7
Average amount ($) 56 78 55
Weekly average number of meals eaten as guest per 
household member 2.36 3.38 2.32
Weekly average number of meals eaten by guests per 
household member 3.66 3.39 3.68
Information on household head:
Employed (%) 13.1 4.3 13.6
Hispanic (%) 32.9 34.8 32.9
Black (%) 22.4 8.7 23.0
Married (%) 22.4 21.7 22.4
Widowed (%) 2.9 4.3 2.9
Divorced (%) 19.4 17.4 19.5
Legally separated (%) 17.8 30.4 17.2
Completed high school (%) 58.8 60.9 58.7
Own home/pay mortgage (%) 1.0 0 1.0
Household information:
Average size 3.9 3.5 3.9
Percentage of households with--
Children 95.1 78.3 95.9
One adult 59.0 69.6 58.5
Female head 76.1 78.3 76.0
Single parent with child(ren) 56.3 56.5 56.3
Percentage of households with--
Child(ren) age 0 – 11 85.7 69.6 86.4
Child(ren) age 12 – 17 30.8 30.4 30.8
Member(s) over age 51 13.1 4.3 13.6
Average number of children for households with children 2.5 2.7 2.4
Notes: WIC is the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
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Appendix table 3—Comparing multi- and single-adult unconstrained stamp households estimates for 
linear model
Unconstrained Single-adult Multi-adult 
households households households
Item (n = 487) (n = 281) (n = 206)
Cash income per household member 0.070** 0.017 0.071**
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018)
Cash income per household member interacted with  -.038
number of adults  (.025)
Food stamp benefits per household member .675** .030 .687**
(.222) (.180) (.224)
Food stamp benefits per household member interacted with  -.474*
number of adults   (.274)
Household size -.692* -1.055 -.605
(.402) (.699) (.497)
Money value of gifts of food per household member .717** .728** .919**
(.230) (.276) (.438)
In-kind food commodity donations per household member -.697** -.831* -.511
(.376) (.450) (.702)
Breakfast subsidy per household member .200 .051 .410
(.405) (.562) (.584)
Lunch subsidy per household member .430** .398* .459*
(.162) (.214) (.253)
Female-headed household -.566 -2.487** -.062
(1.430) (2.857) (1.663)
Weekly meals eaten as guest per household member -1.220** -1.319** -.872**
(.189) (.230) (.352)
Weekly meals eaten by guests per household member 1.062** 1.139** .941**
(.135) (.183) (.206)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 0 to 1  -6.767 -8.647 -7.778
(4.386) (5.748) (7.471)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 2 to 17  -4.887 -8.842* -.281
(3.560) (5.046) (5.199)
Proportion of households with member(s) over age 60  -2.704 -8.180 1.744
(5.394) (8.236) (7.207)
Number of adults in the household 8.843**
(2.989)
Constant 16.350** 33.007** 12.771**
(2.768) (4.746) (3.230)













MPC(FSB) - MPC(Y) .607** .616**
(.222) (.224)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamp
(check) benefits. The dependent variable is per-person food expenditure. The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the variable is
statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
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Appendix table 4—Comparing multi- and single-adult unconstrained stamp households estimates for 
double logarithmic model
Unconstrained Single-adult Multi-adult 
households households households
Item (n = 487) (n = 281) (n = 206)
Log of cash and benefit income per household member 0.534** 0.058 0.536**
(0.067) (0.091) (0.078)
Log of cash and benefit income per household member  -.417**
interacted with number of adults  (.099)
Proportion of food stamp benefits in total cash and benefit income 1.345** .215 1.420**
(.317) (.356) (.349)
Proportion of food stamp benefits in total cash and benefit  -.921**
income member interacted with number of adults  (.452)
Log of household size -.356** -.242** -.399**
(.092) (.122) (.141)
Money value of gifts of food per household member .032 .022* .066**
(.010) (.012) (.021)
In-kind food commodity donations per household member -.022 -.024 -.026
(.017) (.019) (.033)
Breakfast subsidy per household member .002 -.007 .008
(.020) (.024) (.028)
Lunch subsidy per household member .020** .018** .025**
(.007) (.009) (.012)
Female-headed household -.050 -.131 -.015
(.063) (.120) (.080)
Weekly meals eaten as guest per household member -.055** -.059** -.044**
(.008) (.010) (.016)
Weekly meals eaten by guests per household member .036** .039** .032**
(.006) (.008) (.010)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 0 to 1  .166 -.211 .302
(.215) (.277) (.369)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 2 to 17  .334* -.141 .685**
(.188) (.260) (.274)
Proportion of households with member(s) over age 60  -.013 -.165 .086
(.240) (.340) (.348)
Number of adults in the household 1.845**
(.450)
Constant .896** 3.270** .730*
(.341) (.492) (.439)













MPC(FSB) - MPC(Y) .396** .418**
(.093) (.103)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamp
(check) benefits. The dependent variable is log of per-person food expenditure. The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the variable
is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
(currently Food and Nutrition Service).26  Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle / FANRR-12 Economic Research Service/USDA
Appendix table 5—Households with children comparing multi- and single-adult unconstrained stamp
households estimates for linear model
Unconstrained Single-adult Multi-adult 
households households households
Item (n = 465) (n = 270) (n = 195)
Cash income per household member 0.062** 0.023 0.069**
(0.019) (0.023) (0.019)
Cash income per household member interacted with  -.020
number of adults  (.027)
Food stamp benefits per household member .622** -.126 .661**
(.228) (.208) (.221)
Food stamp benefits per household member interacted  -.650*
with number of adults  (.293)
Household size -.935** -1.325* -.704
(.414) (.777) (.476)
Money value of gifts of food per household member .772** .861** .992**
(.232) (.289) (.419)
In-kind food commodity donations per household member -.706* -.853* -.506
(.371) (.452) (.666)
Breakfast subsidy per household member .239 .094 .480
(.399) (.564) (.554)
Lunch subsidy per household member .377** .374* .417*
(.161) (.217) (.242)
Female-headed household -.269 -1.870** -.024
(1.486) (3.267) (1.623)
Weekly meals eaten as guest per household member -1.179** -1.332** -.842**
(.188) (.233) (.345)
Weekly meals eaten by guests per household member 1.023** 1.177** .764**
(.137) (.187) (.203)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 0 to 1  -.801 -3.827 -.750
(5.127) (7.275) (8.363)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 2 to 17  .827 -4.126 5.757
(4.364) (6.764) (6.055)
Proportion of households with member(s) over age 60  -1.312 -23.563 7.193
(7.292) (15.547) (8.045)
Number of adults in the household 7.827**
(3.123)
Constant 15.224** 31.103** 10.174**
(3.012) (5.534) (3.625)













MPC(FSB) - MPC(Y) .560** .591**
(.227) (.220)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamp
(check) benefits. The dependent variable is per-person food expenditure. The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the variable is
statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
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Appendix table 6—For households with children, comparing multi- and single-adult unconstrained house-
holds estimates for double logarithmic model
Unconstrained Single-adult Multi-adult 
households households households
Item (n = 465) (n = 270) (n = 195)
Log of cash and benefit income per household member 0.561** 0.050 0.562**
(0.070) (0.095) (0.079)
Log of cash and benefit income per household member  -.470**
interacted with number of adults  (.104)
Proportion of food stamp benefits in total cash and benefit income 2.446** .194 2.432**
(.465) (.378) (.483)
Proportion of food stamp benefits in total cash and benefit  -2.159**
income member interacted with number of adults  (.582)
Log of household size -.326** -.223* -.336**
(.092) (.128) (.137)
Money value of gifts of food per household member .032 .026** .067**
(.010) (.012) (.020)
In-kind food commodity donations per household member -.022 -.024 -.021
(.017) (.019) (.032)
Breakfast subsidy per household member .003 -.007 .014
(.018) (.024) (.027)
Lunch subsidy per household member .019** .019** .021*
(.007) (.009) (.012)
Female-headed household -.021 -.129 -.004
(.066) (.139) (.079)
Weekly meals eaten as guest per household member -.054** -.060** -.040**
(.008) (.010) (.017)
Weekly meals eaten by guests per household member .037** .041** .030**
(.006) (.008) (.010)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 0 to 1  .180 -.214 .237
(.240) (.327) (.401)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 2 to 17  .347 -.150 .639**
(.212) (.313) (.299)
Proportion of households member(s) over age 60  .059 -.821 .358
(.326) (.665) (.386)
Number of adults in the household 2.193**
(.480)
Constant .594** 3.288* .413
(.362) (.529) (.455)













MPC(FSB) - MPC(Y) .720** .715**
(.137) (.142)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamp
(check) benefits. The dependent variable is log of per-person food expenditure. The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the variable
is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
(currently Food and Nutrition Service).28  Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle / FANRR-12 Economic Research Service/USDA
Appendix table 7—Stamp and check households: Linear model (a)
Pooled Unconstrained
sample stamp Check
Item (n = 953) (n = 487) (n = 466)
Food stamp benefit per household member 0.318** 0.416** 0.221*
(0.089) (0.132) (0.122)
Income per household member .046** .051** .037**
(.010) (.014) (.014)
Household size -1.362** -1.183** -1.488**
(.258) (.362) (.371)
Money value of gifts of food per household member .217 .704** -.015
(.136) (.231) (.173)
In-kind food commodity donations per household member -.270 -.742** -.076
(.187) (.378) (.215)
Household head is Asian 2.064** .571 2.756**
(.903) (1.312) (1.256)
Breakfast subsidy per household member .340 .159 .491
(.283) (.408) (.394)
Lunch subsidy per household member .359** .442** .258
(.117) (.163) (.171)
Female-headed household -1.109** -1.186** -.968**
(.135) (.191) (.193)
Weekly meals eaten as guest per household member .978** 1.039** .986**
(.104) (.136) (.165)
Weekly meals eaten by guests per household member -.155 .726 -1.069
(.850) (1.177) (1.242)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 0 to 1  -3.901 -2.182 -5.196
(2.876) (4.086) (4.083)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 2 to 17  1.593 -.291 3.017
(2.198) (3.162) (3.070)
Proportion of households with member(s) over age 60  3.249 -3.780 7.713
(3.562) (5.404) (4.785)
Household receives food stamp benefits 2.001**
(.577)
Constant 18.597** 19.179** 20.238**
(1.727) (2.491) (2.341)
Adjusted R2 .2571 .2937 .2172
MPC(FSB) .318** .416** .221*
(.089) (.132) (.122)
MPC(Y) .046** .051** .037**
(.010) (.014) (.014)
MPC(FSB) - MPC(Y) .272** .365** .184
(.089) (.132) (.122)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamp
(check) benefits. The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence
level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
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Appendix table 8—Stamp and check households: Double-log model (c)
Pooled Unconstrained
sample stamp Check
Item (n = 953) (n = 487) (n = 466)
Log of cash and benefit income per household member 0.338** 0.385** 0.295**
(0.045) (0.091) (0.069)
Proportion of food stamp benefits in total cash and benefit income .836** 1.065 .608**
(.186) (.247) (.277)
Log of household size -.375** -.327** -.420**
(.057) (.076) (.084)
Money value of gifts of food per household member -.012* .030** -.036**
(.007) (.002) (.009)
In-kind food commodity donations per household member -.028** -.024 -.028**
(.009) (.017) (.012)
Household head is Asian .109** .039 .144**
(.045) (.059) (.068)
Breakfast subsidy per household member .007 .002 .009
(.014) (.018) (.021)
Lunch subsidy per household member .021** .021** .019**
(.006) (.007) (.009)
Female-headed household -.053** -.053** -.048**
(.007) (.009) (.010)
Weekly meals eaten as guest per household member .037** .036** .044**
(.005) (.006) (.009)
Weekly meals eaten by guests per household member -.091** -.030 -.165**
(.045) (.057) (.069)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 0 to 1  .184 .233 .117
(.151) (.193) (.234)
Proportion of households with child(ren) age 2 to 17  .451** .376** .499**
(.122) (.158) (.183)
Proportion of households with member(s) over age 60  .279 -.068 .445*
(.178) (.242) (.259)
Household receives food stamp benefits .110**
(.029)
Constant 1.634** 1.442** 1.925**
(.240) (.317) (.359)
Adjusted R2 .2854 .3462 .2523
MPC(FSB) .307** .393** .235**
(.057) (.078) (.084)
MPC(Y) .069** .075** .063**
(.010) (.013) (.014)
MPC(FSB) - MPC(Y) .238** .318** .172**
(.053) (.074) (.078)
Notes: MPC(Y) is the marginal propensity to consume out of income, and MPC(FSB) is the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamp
(check) benefits. The MPC’s are calculated at median values. The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the variable is statisti-
cally significant at the 90-percent confidence level; ** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
(currently Food and Nutrition Service).30  Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle / FANRR-12 Economic Research Service/USDA
Appendix table 9—Comparison of unconstrained single- and multi-adult households
Item Multi-adult Single-adult
Sample size 206 281
Monthly cash income ($) 1,088.48 762.57
Monthly food stamp benefit ($) 128.02 105.14
Benefits as proportion of income (%) 13.02 13.50
Monthly food expenditure ($) 371.12 281.99
Households with WIC vouchers (%) 14.56 9.25
Average amount ($) 51.63 68.62
Households with school breakfast (%) 23.30 16.37
Average amount ($) 29.08 30.38
Households with school lunch subsidy (%) 53.88 48.40
Average amount ($) 57.21 53.23
Weekly average number of meals eaten as guest per household member 1.87 2.47
Weekly average number of meals eaten by guests per household member 4.47 3.09
Information on household head:
Employed (%) 14 13
Hispanic (%) 37 30
Black (%) 18 27
Married (%) 42.70 7
Widowed (%) 1.94 3.57
Divorced (%) 11.65 25.27
Legally separated (%) 11 21
Completed high school (%) 52.90 62.99
Own home/pay mortgage (%) 3.40 1.07
Household information:
Average size 4.97 3.06
Percentage of households with—
Children 94.66 96.09
One adult 19.90 96.09
Female head 0 96.09
Single parent with child(ren)
Percentage of households with— 87.86 85.41
Child(ren) age 0 – 11 31.10 30.60
Child(ren) age 12 – 17 24.76 5.34
Child(ren) age 12 – 17 24.76 5.34
Members over 51
Average number of children for households with child(ren) 2.64 2.06
Notes: WIC is the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children.
Source: Data are from the San Diego Cash-Out Experiment, conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Service
(currently Food and Nutrition Service).